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The Other Side of the Hill 
Co~nbat Intelligence in the 
Canadian Corps, 1914-1918 
Dan Jenkins 
l:j"'\or some, a discussion on military intelligence 
l. ~ and the First World War is the ultimate 
oxymoron. They might ask: when and where did 
generals display any use of intelligence? That 
the Battle of the Somme continued beyond the 
first clay, they might argue, demonstrates a 
complete lack of military intelligence, or any 
other type of intelligence for that matter. If there 
ever was a war, they might add, where donkey-
like officers led lion-like soldiers to slaughter 
against barbed wire, machine guns, and 
trenches, then the Great War was it. 1 The oft told 
story of how Sir Launcelot Kiggell, Sir Douglas 
Haig's chief of staff, upon seeing the 
Passchenclaele battlefield and its sea of mud and 
carnage, reportedly wept, "My God! Did we send 
men to fight in that?" only to be answered by an 
aid: "It's worse further up," has lent credence to 
the position that the British high command was, 
indeed, incompetent. The myth that British 
generals were donkeys is an old one, and not 
likely to disappear completely anytime soon -
at least in popular imagination. However, a study 
of combat intelligence should help to dispel this 
myth, for when intelligence was used wisely- as 
it usually was in the Canadian Corps - it 
increased the likelihood of success in the field. 
It did this by dispersing some of the fog of war 
and the resulting battlefield confusion. Good 
intelligence gave planners the details necessary 
for preparing the incredibly complex set-piece 
battles that were the hallmark of First World War 
combat. Such meticulous care and precision 
preparation ensured that there were fewer 
surprises on Zero Day, the day of attack, then 
otherwise would have been the case. By cutting 
through the fog of war, intelligence reduced the 
assaulting troops' dependence on circumstance 
and luck, while restoring to commanders some 
degree of control over events in what was an 
otherwise highly chaotic environment. This was 
no small matter, especially on battlefields where 
communications were painfully slow, erratic and 
unreliable. Officers and men of the Great War 
faced conditions and technological advances that 
had completely altered warfare from what they 
had expected and trained for. To compensate, 
the Canadians, and others, used combat 
intelligence to help overcome such obstacles as 
poor communications, heavy machine-gun and 
artillery fire, entrenchments and barberecl wire, 
and came to see it as a crucial element in waging 
successful trench warfare. 
Of course, there was more to winning trench 
warfare than good intelligence, and this should 
be made clear from the beginning. Intelligence 
was only one of many factors leading to 
successful operations. The importance of 
terrain, weather, personality, tactics, bravery, and 
other local and strategic considerations all 
played their part, and their importance cannot 
be dismissed or diminished. Nevertheless, 
intelligence work was vital for planning purposes 
and should be recognised, for intelligence was 
everywhere and permeated all aspects of First 
World War combat. 
Despite its obvious importance to battlefield 
success, combat intelligence remains a relatively 
unexplored topic in Great War historiography. 
J.E. Hahn's 1930 publication The Intelligence 
Service Within the Canadian Corps, 1914-18, 
is the principal exception. It deals directly with 
the nuts and bolts of tactical intelligence 
gathering, and reflects Hahn's experience as an 
intelligence officer in the 4th Canadian Division. 
The Intelligence Service is an excellent place to 
©Canadian Military History, Volume 10, Number 2, Spring 2001, pp. 7-26. 7 
1
Jenkins: The Other Side of the Hill: Combat Intelligence in the Canadian C
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2001
start research on combat intelligence, as Hahn 
explains in an uncritical manner some of the 
Corps' routine intelligence functions, 
organisation and equipment requirements. 
Unfortunately, he does not analyse intelligence 
work in conjunction with other operational 
arms. He omits for the most part any discussion 
of artillery intelligence even though from late 
1916, combat intelligence focused largely on the 
needs of the gunners. Moreover, he sticks mainly 
to the intelligence requirements of divisional and 
lower commands. 2 On the other hand, neither 
the British nor Canadian official histories 
develop intelligence as a theme. 3 This is true for 
other works as well, and largely because most 
authors are simply not concerned with the 
details of intelligence gathering in the field. 
Consequently, we are often left guessing as to its 
hidden importance to operations. It is not 
uncommon to read, for example, that the 
Canadian Corps was facing certain German 
regiments, that these regiments were at half 
strength, tired, suffering from low morale, or 
awaiting reinforcement. What we are not always 
told, though, is if these details were known at 
the time, or if this is historical hindsight at work. 
If they were known at the time, we are usually 
not told how the Canadians came to know such 
8 
A Canadian Artillery observation post in the reserve line, 
January 1918. 
information. The Germans, after all. were not 
stupid, nor did they volunteer information on 
their strengths and weaknesses. In the face of a 
hostile enemy, the Canadians had to gather, 
interpret, sort, and incorporate such information 
into their plans for themselves. The fog of war 
was real, and the Canadian Corps had to find 
ways to navigate through it- for failing to do so 
meant almost certain death for countless young 
men. 
Men who fought in the Great War knew the 
importance of intelligence for wining trench 
warfare, and several of them wrote of their 
experiences. Works by Andrew McNaughton, 
Canada's premier artillery officer during the war, 
and British veterans like John Innes, who wrote 
about flash spotting and sound ranging, H. 
Hesketh-Prichard and his account on sniping, 
and articles by A.F. Brooks and H. 
Winterbotham, who wrote on artillery 
intelligence and survey work respectively, 
provide important insight into the workings of 
intelligence in the field. 4 Unfortunately, their 
efforts to show the difficulties confronting 
officers and men fighting a modern industrial 
war, and the role intelligence played in such a 
war, fell on the public's deaf ears, and were no 
match for publications perpetuating the 
generals-as-donkeys myth. Eventually those who 
knew firsthand the importance of intelligence 
stopped writing about it, and took their 
experiences to their graves. The study of 
intelligence petered out- that is until recently. 5 
Today's scholarship surrounding tactics, 
doctrine, unit organisation, firepower, military 
professionalism, generalship, and logistics have 
successfully challenged the Generals-as-donkeys 
myth. 6 Thanks to these kinds of studies we can 
more clearly see the difficulties faced by officers 
and men of the Great War, and the enormity of 
their challenge in the new combat environment. 
Without our old blinders on it is easier to 
acknowledge the talent and proficiency with 
which British and Canadian officers performed 
their duties. There is no better proof of this than 
the final100 Days campaign that ended the war 
with Germany's defeat. Donkeys could not have 
led such a successful crusade. 
Since the topic of intelligence is so vast, and 
since intelligence permeated every decision made 
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and every action taken in the Great War, it can 
only be touched upon briefly in this article. This 
overview of intelligence in the Canadian Corps 
will, however, show just how important combat 
intelligence was to the Canadian Corps' 
battlefield success. By war's end the Canadian 
intelligence organisation had evolved from an 
understaffed, under-trained, and under-utilised 
force into a highly competent and professional 
body capable of gathering intricate and divergent 
material on the enemy's positions and 
capabilities. Any review of Corps operational 
orders bears witness to the importance of the 
intelligence service. The intelligence organisation 
attempted to track down every possible German 
machine gun location, strong point, observation 
post, and gun emplacement amongst a variety 
of other targets. It monitored both wire 
destruction and construction, followed enemy 
troop movements, identified the locations of 
German reserve units and calculated how long 
it would take these units to reach given sectors 
of the front, and by what likely routes. It was 
not uncommon for contemporary commanders 
to praise the intelligence they received in their 
after-action reports, while pointing out how the 
information helped them win battles. The detail 
contained in operational orders, the desire and 
need to know everything about the German 
position and the intervening terrain, the 
increased complexity and specialisation of the 
intelligence organisation, and the search for new 
and improved techniques for collecting that 
detail, all attest to the value Canadian planners 
placed on the Corps' intelligence organisation. 
The unbroken trench system on the Western 
Front defined the war and determined the role 
intelligence played. The close proximity of the 
opposing lines offered a unique opportunity for 
a tactical intelligence service. Since the enemy 
lived within rifle shot, commanders had to be 
vigilant and prepared to meet enemy forays at 
any time. The closeness of the enemy also 
diminished reaction time, which meant that 
commanders had to discover every indication 
of a forthcoming attack, however slight, to avoid 
surprise and possible catastrophe. There was 
no respite from active campaigning as in past 
wars, when fighting was limited to fair weather 
months. The enemy was always present, and he 
had to be studied to understand his habits; it 
was vital for survival to recognise when he was 
in an aggressive or defensive mode. To this end, 
it came to pass that every headquarters, from 
battalion upwards, compiled detailed reports on 
observations made of German activity seen and 
sounds heard. Such a close analysis of the enemy 
produced a mountain of information for 
headquarters personnel to digest. Most of this 
material may at first appear inconsequential, as 
Intelligence Summaries and patrol and 
observation reports are replete with references 
to seemingly meaningless detail: German 
parapet altered; Germans talking in a particular 
trench or shell hole; a green flare over a certain 
sector; one enemy aircraft flying east to west at 
10:30 am over such-and-such a position. 
However, to trained and experienced intelligence 
personnel, this data helped build a repository 
of facts on various sectors and the German 
activity therein. From such profiles, intelligence 
officers and staff planners pieced together 
possible scenarios outlining German intentions, 
resilience and resolve. The altered parapet might 
mean that the Germans had readied gas 
cylinders for use, or that the Germans were 
constructing dugouts or machine gun posts. The 
men talking might mean relaxed security on this 
part of the German line, and therefore an ideal 
spot for a Canadian raid. Intelligence officers 
would link the green flare to the activity that 
preceded or followed its firing to determine the 
meaning of some of the German signals. They 
would also track the aircraft's flight path to 
determine what the observer was witnessing, and 
to check how far behind friendly lines the plane 
travelled. Knowing what the observer may have 
seen could alter friendly planning. Flight path 
patterns might point to a possible German raid 
or attack on the sector in question. Determining 
how far behind friendly lines the plane travelled 
might show headquarters the depth of 
penetration the Germans expected to obtain, and 
the ultimate objective of the assault. Of course 
one aircraft, or one pile of lumber, or one flare 
was not conclusive evidence for formulating 
opinions of German intentions, but when 
amalgamated with the mass of other evidence 
collected, certain conclusions regarding enemy 
activity, habits and possible intentions, became 
clearer. 
The closeness of the opposing lines did not 
mean thatintelligence gathering was easy. It was 
not simply a matter of looking over a trench wall 
and writing down all that was seen. Time and 
again soldiers' diaries refer to the emptiness of 
9 
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An aerial photograph of a Canadian attack in progress on 
the east end of the Hessian Trench, near Courcellette, on 
26 September 1916. Explosions are clearly visible in the 
top left corner (white puffs with dark shadows underneath). 
Histories ofthe war regularly point out that 
the trench lines barely altered over the four years 
of slaughter. In a strategic sense this may be true. 
At the tactical, trench level, stagnation did not 
occur. Constant shelling and digging, for 
example, continuously transformed the 
landscape. Canadian soldiers who fought in the 
Ypres Sector during the Second Battle ofYpres 
in April1915, hardly recognised the place when 
they returned to it a year later. By November 
1917, during the Third Battle of Ypres, the 
terrain had become wholly unrecognisable. 
Where woods and farms once stood there 
remained but a few burnt stumps and the 
occasional brick or stone. Physical features were 
&i obliterated under the weight of millions of 
~ artillery rounds, and their locations were known 
7 
u only because they were once marked on maps. 
~ Terrain features changed from one day to the 
z next, and soldiers, even with maps in hand, often 
the battlefield. Rarely did one see a live German. 
For one thing, anyone popping their head up over 
the parapet for more than a couple of seconds, 
and in the same spot more than once, was liable 
to lose it to an enemy sniper. One of the first 
warnings every man received when entering the 
trenches for the first time was "Fear God and 
keep your head down." Snipers made death 
come quickly. Alexander McClinton, a sergeant 
with the 87th Battalion, recalled one instance 
where one of his mates stood "on the firing step, 
pushed back his trench helmet and remarked 
that he thought it was about time for coffee. He 
didn't get any. A German sharpshooter, firing for 
the first time that day, got him under the rim of 
his helmet, and his career with the Canadian 
forces was over right there."7 If snipers were not 
active at the time it was still unlikely that peeking 
over a trench wall would gain much advantage. 
One could not see everything that needed to be 
seen from friendly lines at ground level, even 
with the aid of a telescope or field glasses. An 
enormous effort was involved in gathering 
intelligence, and it became more complex as the 
war progressed. Techniques for unmasking 
enemy positions increased in complexity hand-
in-hand with the enemy's efforts to conceal them. 
10 
had no idea where they were. Sergeant 
McClintock remembered the devastation along 
the Somme front in 1916 where he "went 
through the town of Pozieres twice and didn't 
know it. It had a population of 12,000 before 
the war. On the spot where it had stood not even 
a whole brick was left, it seemed. Its demolition 
was complete." e 
Defensive works, too, continually changed. 
Every day the Germans added new wire 
entanglements, strengthened and thickened 
those already in place, built dugouts, and shifted 
and camouflaged artillery emplacements, 
observation posts and unit headquarters. 
Trenches were always under construction, saps 
dug, assault preparations made, reliefs in the 
line carried out, and new tactics experimented 
with. The British Army's General Headquarters' 
(GHQ) call to identify the constantly shuffled 
German units was itself a tremendous task that 
devoured enormous time and effort. To keep 
abreast of the incessant and rapid alterations to 
the ground and the enemy's position, 
commanders and men required a well organised 
and efficient intelligence service. 
Since the tactical arena changed so quickly, 
and so often, the need for planning information 
4
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continued up to the last possible moment prior 
to Zero Hour. Prior to raids and major offensives, 
the collected intelligence meant that maps, 
photographs, and training grounds could be 
constantly up-dated to reflect the latest news. 
One man remembered that when training for one 
particular raid "Our practice section [of trench] 
was changed a little several times, because aerial 
photographs showed that the Germans had been 
renovating and making some additions to the 
trenches in which we were to have our frolic with 
them. "9 After the Battle of Passchendaele, 
Brigadier General W.A. Griesbach, commanding 
the 1st Brigade, noted how small details affected 
planing right up to the moment of attack. In his 
after-action report he recorded that when the 
brigade "learned that the enemy brought his 
barrage down either on or immediately in rear 
of our line, it was agreed that our forming up 
for the attack should be as close to the enemy 
as possible." Further, 
When it was learned that whole companies had 
been shot down and lay dead practically in the 
line on which they stood while advancing under 
the barrage. it was agreed that this Brigade would 
advance to the attack in section columns behind 
the barrage dashing from cover to cover, which 
was done and was successful. When it was 
learned that the enemy took cover in his pill 
boxes but fought from trenches in the 
neighbourhood of the pill box. it was agreed that 
the attack must be made at high speed and with 
great determination to catch the enemy before 
he emerged from his pill box or as soon 
thereafter as possible and this was carried out 
and it was successful. 10 
With proper intelligence, the 
"poor bloody infantry" had a ~ 
better chance at surviving the ~ 
crossing of no-man's-land. ~ 
Battlefield intelligence did not ~ 
guarantee success, but without 
it there was almost a certainty 
of failure. 
The advent of aerial 
observation and the closeness of 
the opposing lines increased the 
demand for camouflage and 
deception during the war, which 
required further adaptation in 
the trenches. The British Army, 
A team of horses pulls a dummy tank 
into position, December 1917. 
for example, occasionally placed dummy 
soldiers in the trenches and manipulated them 
by ropes. It also used imitation sandbags, 
periscopes and sniper posts, and even built 
entire sections of simulated trench. The 
artillery used camouflaged netting and hid their 
guns under trees and in towns. Artificial gun 
flashes helped deceive enemy flash-spotters. 
Fake gun emplacements, craters and tracks 
also helped trick aerial observers and deceive 
photographic clerks examining the black and 
white images of the trenches. Dummy tanks 
were used at Lens, in August 1917; and prior 
to the Battle of Amiens in August 1918, the 
Canadians used bogus wireless traffic in an 
effort to deceive the Germans about their 
location. To aid in the art of deception the 
British created a camouflage organisation in 
March 1916, and even concealed its intent by 
giving it the innocuous sounding name "Special 
Works Park R.E." It was a GHQ unit under the 
direct control of the Engineer-in-Chief, and by 
August 1918 employed nearly 300 men. In 
1918, the Canadian Corps added its own 
camouflage officer to its organisation to aid the 
Corps' deception efforts. The Germans, likewise, 
increased their concealment practices. 
Intelligence personnel were kept busy sifting 
through the false information to discover the 
truth about the opposing lines. 
The strength of the German defences 
themselves called for intimate and ongoing study. 
If assaults against a German position were to 
have any chance of success, the strengths and 
weaknesses of those defences had to be 
5
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discovered beforehand. The Canadians soon 
realised that intelligence officers, by steadfastly 
monitoring the German position, could create 
profiles of given sectors outlining their suspected 
weak spots. They could also note patterns in 
German defensive methods. Knowing, among 
other things, where unit and formation 
boundaries ended, the usual time and frequency 
of troop relief, and the typical layout of a machine 
gun defence, aided Canadian planning, helped 
win objectives, and reduced casualties in those 
commands that took the time to learn such 
details. Understanding friendly and enemy tactics 
was, therefore, another facet of successful 
intelligence work. Intelligence officers had to work 
hand-in-hand with the operations branch, and 
be current with improvements in the tactical 
deployment of both friendly and enemy troops. 
Knowledge of the overall plan was obligatory if 
the required information was to be gathered as 
part of an ongoing process. Intelligence personnel 
had to understand enemy tactics in order to know 
what to look for, when to look for it, and where to 
concentrate their efforts. 
Meanwhile, the Canadian Corps' position in 
the larger British Army sometimes affected the 
utility of combat intelligence gathered by the front 
line troops and intelligence units. With the 
Canadian command subordinate to British 
authority, it was the British who made strategic 
and most operational planning decisions. The 
Canadians, regardless of what their intelligence 
organisation told them, did not always have the 
freedom of action to alter British-made plans. 
This was particularly the case early in the war, 
and before the Canadians earned their elite 
status. If the British ordered the Canadians to 
prepare an assault, that is what they did, even if 
intelligence reports suggested that such an 
assault was tantamount to suicide. The 
Canadians might object, and often did, but if a 
reprieve was not granted, they prepared their 
assault. 11 This is not meant as a criticism of army 
command structures, but it is important to 
remember that lower level formations were not 
always given much room to exercise 
independence of thought, be they Canadian or 
any other British formation. 
On the other hand, being a subordinate 
formation within the larger British Expeditionary 
Force meant the Canadians were privy to a wealth 
of British battlefield experience and 
12 
organisational expertise. General Headquarters 
had numerous sources of intelligence available 
to it: armies in the field, allies, the army's secret 
service, and the foreign office's own secret service. 
Armies had their own organisations and 
intelligence, too, which they cheerfully shared 
with their Imperial brethren. Each level of 
command sought and generated different kinds 
of intelligence. GHQ was largely concerned with 
strategic and operational level intelligence, with 
its greatest interest being the German order of 
battle. That is to say, GHQ wanted to know the 
composition of the German Army, how the 
constituent parts were grouped to fight under 
the various commands, and the combat 
reputations of those parts. 12 It wanted to know 
which divisions made up what German corps, 
along with the fighting reputations of the various 
commanders and formations. Knowing the 
composition of the German Army, (i.e. the 
number of corps, divisions, brigades and 
regiments) let GHQ track individual German 
formations and units across the front. By plotting 
troop movements and positions GHQ estimated 
probable locations for German offensive and 
defensive operations. The German order of battle, 
in other words, gave planners insight into the 
mind of the enemy high command. Identifying 
enemy units and formations was thus a major 
concern of GHQ, and this concern filtered down 
to battalions at the front whose role it was to 
collect the information necessary (from prisoners, 
documents, and other identifying material) for 
higher command to confirm the actual 
identifications. 
GHQ had an interest in tactical intelligence 
as well. It regularly issued translations of 
captured German documents outlining enemy 
tactical doctrine, and published its own tactical 
pamphlets for BEF consumption. These were 
invaluable tools for lower level commands when 
planning offensive and defensive operations. 
GHQ intelligence also prepared evaluations on 
German attack methods, defensive techniques 
and signals. In a 23 February 1915 
memorandum, for instance, GHQ discussed the 
German propensity for swift counter attacks on 
any Allied gains, and counselled taking this fact 
into consideration when planning offensives. J:J 
Captured German documents describing lessons 
learned from recent fighting were also invaluable 
as guides for what to expect in the future. 
Again, friendly troops could prepare accordingly. 
6
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This Allied trench map shows a sector of the Vimy front around the town of Thelus in 1917. The map shows the trench 
systems, both Allied and German, in considerable detail (based on aerial photographs) and includes the German 
names for the trenches (gained from captured enemy documents and prisoners of war). 
Helpful, too, were captured German 
appreciations of Allied battle techniques. After 
all, it was always good to know what the enemy 
expected in order to do the opposite. 
At army and corps headquarters the 
intelligence requirements shifted. By war's end, 
the British fielded five armies, all with 
intelligence interests similar to those of GHQ, 
but on a narrower scale. At the same time, 
armies needed to learn more about the tactical 
situation along their fronts than was of interest 
to GHQ. Corps, on the other hand, were 
principally concerned with tactical intelligence, 
but had some interest in the larger strategic and 
operational interpretations made by army 
command and GHQ. To help co-ordinate and 
control intelligence, the Canadian and other 
corps prepared and printed for distribution a 
daily Intelligence Summary of the previous day's 
more salient discoveries and activities. These 
provided a standardised, detailed recounting of 
all new information on the enemy's defensive 
position, including the location of gun 
emplacements, the depth of wire entanglements, 
and the location of dugouts, billeting areas and 
lines of approach. As well, corps and army 
commands were keenly interested in knowing 
the location of ammunition dumps, rail lines and 
so on, so that in the event of a breakthrough, 
they would better understand what lay in the 
green fields beyond. Corps also wanted to know 
the number of German divisions in a given 
sector. This was a good indicator of the number 
of German batteries located there, as each 
German division held a specific number of guns. 
In turn, the disposition of the artillery was 
usually a clear measure of the enemy's 
aggressiveness. The number, calibre and range 
of German guns, along with knowledge of the 
exact direction they faced, told commanders a 
great deal about possible German actions and 
responses. 
Enemy tactical dispositions were the main 
concern of divisions, brigades and battalions. 
Where exactly are the German machine guns 
placed? Where exactly are their listening 
stations, observation posts and command 
centres? Where exactly are their communication 
centres? Planners wanted answers to these and 
a host of similar questions before assault plans 
were finalised, for it was only in answering these 
questions that headquarters could successfully 
calculate and implement its plans. Moreover, 
unit and formation commands made every effort 
to learn for themselves the identity of the 
German units opposite, as front line 
commanders, like their GHQ counterparts, 
wanted to know the reputations of those they 
faced. To varying degrees, divisions, brigades 
and battalions were also interested in what lay 
behind the enemy's front line trenches. The 
battalions' main concern, however, was in 
13 
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Figure One- Intelligence Sources in the Canadian Corps, August 1916 
learning about no-man's-land and the German 
front line trench system. To do this all battalions, 
by May 1916, had formed specialist scouting 
units, under a scout officer, that were responsible 
for battalion-level intelligence gathering. By 1918 
the scout section, also known as the battalion 
scouts, proved so valuable that the Canadians 
added a second officer to its strength. This meant 
the typical scout section employed about 28 men: 
eight snipers, eight observers, eight scouts, one 
scout corporal, one photographic clerk and 
draughtsman, and two officers. Brigades had 
interests similar to battalions, but were also 
interested in areas further to the rear. Like 
battalions, brigades formed their own intelligence 
sections to gather this information. Divisions, too, 
were interested in the front lines, but were even 
more concerned with the German rear areas. 
Divisional intelligence teams were led by one of 
the two General Staff Officers, second grade, 
(GS02s), serving in Canadian divisions. In effect, 
the closer a given command was to the front lines, 
the more detail that command sought on the 
German lines immediately across from them. The 
further back a command lay, the more interest 
it had in areas further behind the German front. 
Figure One, "Intelligence Sources in the 
Canadian Corps, August 1916" shows some of 
the organisational complexity of the intelligence 
system as practised by Canadians midway 
14 
through 1916. 14 As intricate as it was, this 
organisation got even more complicated with 
each passing year. In 1917, for example, a 
Counter Battery Office (CBO) was formed to 
control artillery intelligence. Eventually this 
office became the hub around which all Corps 
intelligence swirled. By 1917, the artillery was 
clearly the dominant weapon system on the 
Western Front, and its intelligence needs were 
pervasive and paramount. As such, the CBO 
eventually reached the point where it received 
and interpreted most tactical intelligence 
generated in the Corps, especially if it affected 
gunner efficiency and action. With its being 
linked to every source of intelligence in and 
supporting the corps, the CBO was always up-
to-the-minute on the latest German 
movements. In addition, the CBO, through a 
quirk in the Corps' command structure, was 
also the Heavy Artillery's tactical headquarters, 
and by being well connected to these and every 
other battery within and along the Corps' front, 
the CBO could quickly return a devastating 
barrage on targets wherever one was needed 
most. Through its control and use of tactical 
intelligence the CBO became one of the most 
powerful tools in the British and Canadian war 
effort. 1" 
In 1918, the Canadian Corps added the 
Canadian Corps Survey Section (CCSS) to its 
8
Canadian Military History, Vol. 10 [2001], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol10/iss2/2
structure. The CCSS was a mobile, tactical 
intelligence gathering body formed in 
anticipation of the more open fighting expected 
that year, and in response to lessons learned 
in 1917 and during the Germans' March 1918 
Spring Offensive. It employed 177 all ranks, 
was commanded by Captain W.R. Flewin, and 
was under the CBO's tactical control. Part of 
the cess team consisted of ground observers 
who followed front line action closely, and 
reported the latest friendly and enemy positions 
to its headquarters, which, as it so happened, 
was usually situated alongside the CBO. At the 
same time, the cess flash spotters maintained 
a constant vigilance for enemy artillery action 
and movement. 16 Combined with other sources 
of information, such as the Royal Air Force, 
the cess helped maintain a flow of reliable 
information during the more fluid battles of the 
100 Days Campaign. 17 
Figure Two, "Battalion-level Intelligence 
Gathering, March 1916," illustrates something 
of the interconnectedness of front line 
intelligence gathering, and its importance in 
offering protection against surprise. 18 As shown 
in Figure Two, patrols (marked as D 1 and D2) 
occupied the forward-most positions. These 
parties patrolled no-man's-land each evening on 
fact-finding missions, and acted as security 
screens for friendly trench garrisons and work 
parties. Operating just behind the patrols, but 
usually outside friendly wire, were the listening 
posts (represented as A1-A4). Like patrols, 
listening-post work was normally conducted at 
night. Further to the rear were trench observers, 
snipers and sentries who kept watch during the 
day and night. Ideally, patrols, observers, sniper 
teams, listening post men, trench sentries, and 
others worked together, confirming and verifying 
reports, and guarding against surprise. Knowing 
that a watch was kept, no doubt, also gave the 
men in the trenches some degree of comfort, and 
let them catch up on some much needed rest. 
Compared to 1918, the battles of 1915-17 
were highly rigid in their planning and execution. 
In the summer of 1915, for example, the British 
IV Corps advised the Canadians preparing to 
assault at Givenchy that "The air photographs 
and large scale maps now available admit of the 
plan of operation being worked out in very great 
detail previous to the attack, and under present 
conditions in which communication is so 
Figure Two- Battalion-level Intelligence Gathering, March 1916 
Legend 
A1-4: Listening Post (LP) Line. 
Nine men per post on three man 
shifts, and placed in or behind 
obstacles (shell holes, ditches, 
walls). Distance out: 75-125 yards. 
81-4: Trench sentries, each with a 
relief that sleeps by him, connected 
to LP by cord or telephone wire. 
Wire connected to alarm to attract 
sentry's attention. 
C1-4: Trenches or ditches used in 
extreme light or in local conditions 
where posts further forward are 
inadvisable. Also used by support 
groups or on nights that extra 
observers are required. 
W1-3: Lateral tug wires. 
01-2: Patrols. Only one goes out 
at a time. All posts informed. All 
advanced patrolling performed by 
regular scouts. 
B1-A1; B2-A2; B3-A3; B4-A4: Tug 
lines from LPs to sentries. 
wire 
no-man's-land 
no-man's-land 
'
enemy 
trench 
line 
no-man's-land 
9
Jenkins: The Other Side of the Hill: Combat Intelligence in the Canadian C
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2001
difficult, it is essential that this should be done 
by the Commanders concerned who must 
satisfy themselves that every detail has been 
considered." 19 The British document "Principle 
Points to be Attended to in Making Preliminary 
Arrangements," first issued after the Battle of 
Laos in September 1915, declared that "Each 
attack must be thought out in every detail, and 
all arrangements worked out beforehand as 
completely as possible." Everything, from 
artillery plans, to signal arrangements, to the 
timing that troops captured their objectives, was 
determined in advance. 20 
These years saw the perfecting of the set-
piece assault. By their very nature these attacks 
left little room for junior officer and other rank 
initiative, as they were elaborately planned affairs 
in which commanding officers and their staffs 
made all major tactical decisions in advance. 
They also planned each phase of the assault to 
the minute. In these years communications, 
counter battery fire and tactical training were 
simply too brittle and under-developed to leave 
the fate of an advance to junior officers and other 
ranks- and so the need for elaborate pre-battle 
planning. The fact that battalion and higher 
commanders could not control the action once 
it began reinforced the need for minute planning 
prior to assaults. 21 Stated another way, 
commanders, unable to control the action while 
it raged, sought to control the fighting in advance 
by planning operations to their fullest in the 
relative calm of normal trench warfare. In such 
a world, pre-battle intelligence, and the intensive 
planning it permitted. restored to commanders 
some degree of control over chaotic battlefields. 
For the Canadians the zenith of such top-
down control occurred at Vimy Ridge in April 
1917. As is well known, that assault was 
meticulously planned to the finest detail. Men 
learned by rote when and where to go on a 
minute by minute basis. The 76th Battalion's 
orders offer a case in point. The movements of 
its companies were precisely timed. According 
to orders, at sixty minutes before Zero Hour the 
troops were to begin arriving at the jump-off 
trenches. At thirty minutes before Zero all ranks 
were to be in position. At Zero the advance was 
to begin, and seventeen minutes later "C" and 
"D" Companies were "to take up sheltered 
positions behind [specified] craters." Twelve 
minutes after that "A" and "B" Companies were 
16 
to "take objectives and commence 
consolidation." Sixteen minutes later, or forty-
five minutes past Zero, "C" and "D" Companies 
were to move forward, followed at Zero plus 
seventy-nine minutes by taking and 
consolidating their assigned objectives.22 There 
was no margin for error or delay in these 
instructions, nor was time allowed for 
overcoming any unforeseen difficulties; it was 
all matter-of-fact, and precisely pre-calculated. 
Obstacles were removed during the pre-battle 
planning stage. Timetable tactics, in effect, 
greatly reduced command confusion, because 
all foreseen contingencies and difficulties were 
accounted for in advance of the attack - an 
accounting based on a massive quantity of pre-
battle intelligence. 
Pre-planning and intensive rehearsals over 
replicas of enemy terrain in the weeks before 
Zero burned into the minds of attacking troops 
their role in up-coming fights. In this way, should 
communications fail, as they likely would, or 
some other difficulty arise to the point where 
rear area officers lost touch with the progress of 
their units, the attack would not necessarily 
falter and die. Each day. as new intelligence came 
in, the models were up-dated to reflect the latest 
changes in the German defences and the 
intervening terrain. At Vimy Ridge, as we have 
seen, plans for the assault- one that would see 
all four Canadian divisions attacking at the same 
time for the first time- were extremely thorough. 
Intelligence gathering took weeks and months 
to complete. The 7th Brigade's report titled 
"Information regarding German Signal Service," 
of 2 April 1917, for example, outlines the 
German communications system. Its simple 
description belies the enormity of the task. 
"Thus, summarizing the information, it has been 
possible to work out the German system of 
telephonic communication right from the front 
line to Regimental and Divisional Headquarters, 
and this is one of the most valuable items of 
information required for our operations. Their 
destruction will seriously inconvenience the 
enemy. "2:1 A measure of the intelligence effort 
involved in planning can also be seen in the 1st 
Division's preparation of a 1 I 2,500 scale map of 
its sector that it up-dated each day. This map 
was in addition to all the army issued maps also 
available to the Canadians. The 1/2,500 scale 
map, however, was far more detailed, showing 
all the German trenches along with their German 
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names (obtained from a captured map), all 
known trench mortar and machine gun 
emplacements, dugouts, observation posts, and 
so on. Airplane photographs and ground 
observation also proved valuable for 
accumulating this detail. According to a 
divisional report "This Map was subsequently 
proved to be very accurate and was of immense 
value to all Units." It was also used to prepare a 
full-scale practice course taped out over ground 
similar to that which the Canadians would soon 
be assaulting. On this practice ground 
Every trench was shown by tape and flag, 
numerous "Name Boards" being put up showing 
the German name: trench mortar emplacements 
and machine gun emplacements, Battalion, 
Company, and Signalling Headquarters were all 
marked on the ground. All Units, Infantry, 
Engineers. and F.O.Os. [Forward Observation 
Officers] that were to go over in the attack were 
practiced in turn. and in conjunction with each 
other over this Course ... 
In addition ... a Plasticine Model on a Scale of 1 I 
5.000 was prepared for the Division by an 
Intelligence Officer at the First Army 
Headquarters, assisted by a Draughtsman of the 
Division. This Model was set up in a Hall at 
Divisional Headquarters and studied by all 
ranks, Artillery, Machine Gunners and Infantry.24 
Captain James Belton and Lieutenant E.G 
Odell, in their book Hunting the Hun, recalled: 
"When we reached our training areas, we saw 
hundreds of yards of white tapes two inches 
wide, stretched out before us. These tapes 
represented to us the outline of the German 
trenches which we were to attack and capture 
on Vimy Ridge. They lay on the ground in exactly 
the same position that we would later find the 
German trenches. "2 .s Each division made similar 
preparations, and the value of these training 
courses to the final victory cannot be overstated. 
The 3rd Division, in its after-action report, said 
that with only one exception 
all the objectives were gained and consolidated, 
with comparatively slight loss, in practically the 
identical manner and time thai had been 
repeatedly practiced over a facsimile of the 
trenches. Every man and Machine Gun arrived 
in the appointed place, there was no loss of 
direction. and the consolidation of the advanced 
posts and defensive line was carried out precisely 
as practiced. 26 
Vimy Ridge was not the only operation where 
models and replicas were used. The Canadians 
also used them prior to their assaults at Mount 
Sorrel in June 1916, along the Somme in the 
autumn, at Hill 70 in August 1917, and at 
Passchendaele in the following October and 
November. At Hill 70, as at Vimy Ridge the 
previous April, the Canadians taped out 
practice courses on ground similar to that they 
would cross on Z-Day. The 1st Division's course 
was made on a four-fifths scale. Some of the 
information for building it came from local 
inhabitants, but most came from airplane 
photographs, ground surveillance and patrols. 
The course depicted every German trench by 
tape and flag. Again, "Name Boards" were put 
up showing the German identified trenches and 
positions, while "trench mortar and machine gun 
emplacements, Battalion, Company, and 
Signalling Headquarters were all marked on the 
ground." Miniature models of the area were 
constructed as well. The 2nd Brigade built one 
such model on a scale of 1:40 at its training 
school. In addition, an intelligence officer with 
the 1st Army prepared a plasticine model of the 
area on a l: 5,000 scale, and invited the 
Canadians to study it. From these courses and 
models the Canadians, with British assistance, 
worked out solutions to specific tactical 
problems they would face during the advance. 27 
Such detailed planning was not just for the 
benefit of commanders and their staffs, though, 
as it also helped the lower ranks reach their 
objectives. Sergeant McClintock recalled: "It is 
interesting to note how every attack nowadays, 
is worked out in advance in the smallest detail, 
and how everything is done on a time schedule. 
Aerial photographs of the position they are 
expected to capture are furnished to each 
battalion, and the men are given the fullest 
opportunity to study them." Everybody had 
"certain work to do and is instructed and re-
instructed until there can be no doubt that he 
has clear knowledge of his orders." In addition, 
rehearsals and study, all based on the latest 
intelligence, helped each man "understand the 
scope and purpose and plan of the whole 
operation, so that he will know what to do if he 
finds himself with no officer to command." All 
ranks had to "know what to do and how to do 
it," and to think for themselves and "'carry on' 
with the general plan," even if all the officers 
and NCOs became casualties. McClintock 
remembered his first experience raiding the 
enemy lines and how "Once we started, we were 
neither fearful, nor rattled. We had drilled so 
17 
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long and so carefully that each man knew just 
what he was to do and he kept right on doing it 
unless he got hit," and this despite the noise, 
the stench, the shelling and the dead bodies the 
assaulting troops stumbled over. Indeed, he 
recalled that the German trenches he entered 
during one raid "were practically just as we had 
expected to find them ... They were so nearly 
similar to the duplicate section in which we had 
practiced that we had no trouble finding our way 
in them." McClintock credits two acts that made 
it possible to carry out orders. 
One was the momentary quickening of the blood 
which follows a big and unaccustomed dose of 
rum and the other was a sort of subconscious, 
mechanical confidence in our undertaking which 
was the result of the scores of times we had gone 
through every prearranged movement in the 
duplicate German trenches behind our lines. 
Without either of those int1uences, we simply 
could not have left shelter and faced what was 
before us. 
There was still tremendous chaos at the front 
end, to be sure, but careful planning helped the 
troops keep their heads in environments where 
they should have gone mad. This is not to say 
that soldiers were not frightened - that would 
be absurd, "Thinking men could not help but 
be afraid." There was comfort, however, in 
knowing that plans were well worked out in 
advance, and based on the most complete and 
thorough intelligence possible. 28 
While it seems obvious that intelligence 
played an important role in Canadian Corps set-
piece attacks, the lack of intelligence also had 
repercussions. At the Battle of Second Ypres in 
April1915, the Canadians and their allies were 
caught completely off guard by the German 
assault and their use of poison gas, even though 
there was ample evidence to show that such an 
attack was imminent. On 14 April, eight days 
prior to the German offensive, the Canadians 
learned from the British V Corps of the 
possibility of a German gas attack. The next day 
the corps informed the 1st Canadian Division 
that it was "not possible to test its [the report of 
a possible poison gas attack] credibility but 
certain facts tend to corroborate it. The Corps 
Commander directs that all precautions are to 
be taken which would be taken if its credibility 
were established." Some of the clues offered as 
proof of a possible attack included reports that 
the Germans had brought up additional 
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reinforcements and artillery. The Corps' note 
ended with a warning that "It is possible that 
the attack may be postponed, if the wind is not 
favourable, so as to blow the gases over our 
trenches."29 Other warnings arrived at the British 
and French headquarters. A German deserter 
taken by the French on the thirteenth gave the 
details ofthe proposed attack, although the story 
of a second deserter captured by the French a 
few days later offered contradictory information. 
This, along with the Royal Flying Corps' (RFC) 
failure to observe any inordinate German activity, 
and the failure of the German assault to 
materialise as expected during the night of 15-
16 April, caused the Allied high command to 
relax its vigilance. The warning that the Germans 
required a favourable wind- something that did 
not occur on the original assault date - was 
forgotten. By April twenty-second the British had 
switched their attention to another portion of 
the line. The Canadians, still being amateurs at 
the time, took their cue from the British and 
also stopped worrying about the possibility of a 
poison gas attack. The result, as is well known, 
was the near loss of the Ypres Sector and a sixty-
percent casualty rate amongst the Canadians 
caught in the German snare.30 
During the Canadians Corps' first trench 
raid in November 1915, the lack of intelligence 
helped prevent the 5th Battalion's raiding party 
from entering the German trenches. Fortunately 
for the Canadians a second raiding party, 
comprised of men from the 7th Battalion, more 
than made up for the fifth's short-coming. 
Assaulting troops from the 5th Battalion 
stumbled onto a previously undiscovered water-
filled ditch that blocked their path. Rendering 
passage more hazardous was a wire 
entanglement placed at its bottom. Crossing it 
was impossible, so the raiders had to content 
themselves with lobbing a few grenades into the 
German trench and making a hasty retreat.:JJ At 
the Somme, in October 1916, General Arthur 
Currie, commander of the 1st Canadian 
Division, pointed to poor intelligence work as a 
contributing factor in his command's defeat at 
Regina Trench. Patrol reports, he said, provided 
a completely erroneous picture of the actual 
conditions along the front by suggesting that the 
artillery had effectively cut the German protective 
wire. From these reports Currie "came to the 
conclusion that while a certain amount of wire 
was to be expected, it would offer no serious 
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obstacle. The attacking troops were warned of 
this and additional wire cutters served out as 
an extra precaution." Events proved the 
intelligence wrong. Currie wrote: 
Reports on the condition of the wire were 
unsatisfactory. Observation on the wire was poor 
from the position occupied by our Infantry 
Observers and the limited time at the disposal 
of the Division did not permit of a protracted 
search for suitable O.Ps. [observation posts]. 
Patrols were sent out, but owing to [the rapidity 
of trench] reliefs these men never became 
thoroughly acquainted with the ground and their 
reports have since been proved to be very 
inaccurate. Owing to weather conditions 
Aeroplane reconnaissance photos were not 
available. 
In addition, Currie noted that patrolmen were 
inexperienced due to the large influx of green 
troops necessary after the heavy casualties 
suffered in previous engagements. In the difficult 
fighting that followed, attacking troops from 
some units were caught on the wire and mowed 
down by enemy machine guns. In other units 
the wire drove the men into the trenches where 
they tried to make their way to their objectives 
by bombing their way forward from trench to 
trench. They were unprepared for this type of 
close fighting, however, and soon ran out of 
grenades, leaving them nearly defenceless. 
German counter attacks forced them back to 
their start lines. 32 
Despite these kinds of setbacks, most 
operations saw officers and men praise the 
intelligence organisation's efforts and 
acknowledge its importance to winning trench 
warfare. After its part in the fighting for Regina 
and Desire Trenches during the later stages of 
the Somme battle, the 87th Battalion declared: 
In the attack of October 21st we had great 
success ... partly due to the fact that everybody 
was well acquainted with the landmarks. A week 
before going up we made a model on a piece of 
ground in our camp of the area which we should 
have to go over. This showed all contours, 
villages, trenches, C.T's [communication 
trenches] and other landmarks and as every man 
in the Battalion had been instructed in it and 
studied it the consequence was that once in the 
area they felt that they knew where they were."" 
Of course, the model was based on the latest 
intelligence. The 11th Brigade, too, was highly 
laudatory of observation work during that same 
assault. 
An Observation Post was established in a 
commanding position behind and connected to 
the Brigade Commander by telephone. During 
the first operation [October twenty-first against 
Regina Trench] the Brigade Intelligence Officer 
kept the G.O.C. [General Officer Commanding] 
informed minute by minute of the progress of 
events and as a result, on several occasions 
artillery action, promptly ordered, nipped off 
budding counter attacks. "4 
After their phenomenal success at Vimy Ridge 
in April 191 7, the Canadians heaped further 
A Canadian officer questions a captured German soldier, May 1917. 
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praise on their intelligence service. The 3rd 
Brigade reported: 
The extraordinary success that the operation 
met wilh, running as it did absolutely to time-
table, emphasized the value of the training 
received; the artillery preparation and co-
operation, and the individual self confidence 
of every man. Officers and Non-commissioned 
Officers recognized the ground, and found that 
what the Intelligence had told them that they 
might expect to find in the way of dugouts, 
trench mortar emplacements, machine gun 
emplacements, etc., etc., they most certainly 
did find.'l5 
General Currie, when summarising his division's 
role in the battle, made this assessment of the 
intelligence contribution: 
The data had been very carefully arranged by 
the Intelligence Branch of the Division and 
proved very accurate and reliable. This fact 
enabled targets of real value to be engaged by 
the Heavy Artillery with the best results and the 
minimum expenditure of ammunition 
compatible with the task. The accurate location 
of dugouts taken from a study of aeroplane 
photographs was of great value in selecting 
positions of Battalion Headquarters and 
Advanced Report Centres as the advance 
progressed. 
The intelligence gained of the habits of the enemy 
so as to enable us to harass him with the greatest 
result, and lhe accurate information gained of 
lhe area over which we had to attack was, I 
consider, one of the main causes of our success.36 
Similar praise for intelligence work was 
recounted in the other units and formations in 
this and other actions throughout the warY 
So far this article has explored the importance 
of pre-battle intelligence. However, intelligence 
gatherers continued to collect information during 
operations. For the most part, it was used for 
monitoring the progress of decisions already 
made in the months, weeks and days leading up 
to the advance, and not so much for making 
important command decisions as the fighting 
unfolded. There were, though, some occasions 
where the information gathered was vital for 
immediate decision-making, encouraging 
commanders to push forward their reserves or 
to continue pressing the enemy. During the 26 
October 1917 assault at Passchendaele, for 
example, troops from the 3rd Division were 
ordered to capture a promontory called Bellevue 
Spur. It was an important piece of high ground 
20 
needed as a base for future assaults against 
Passchendaele Ridge. At one point, when it looked 
as if the assault had failed, brigade observers 
from the left attacking brigade "insisted that men 
of the Right Brigade were still to be seen on the 
Crest of BELLEVUE," even though "all other 
reports indicated that the right Brigade troops 
were back in theirJ.O.T. [jumpingofftrenches]."'38 
"This information at that time was invaluable," 
for it meant the assault could still be salvaged. 
Units from the supporting reserve battalion were 
sent forward to help clear up the situation and 
to join forces with the men holding out on the 
ridge, with the result that "the Spur was 
completely in our possession by the afternoon. "'19 
Incidentally, this example also demonstrates the 
importance of brigade observers as intelligence 
gatherers during an action, and showed that the 
effort involved in maintaining them was well 
worth while. 
By March 1918, when the Germans launched 
their long-awaited offensive, tactics, unit-level 
firepower, logistical support, communications, 
and gunnery technique had all improved 
dramatically since 1916. The result was a more 
fluid battlefield, one that saw greater ebbs and 
flows, deeper penetrations, and a more 
sophisticated, all-arms approach to operations. 
Moreover, the Germans launched their attacks 
in rapid succession to take advantage of their 
new stormtroop tactics and the disruption they 
caused Allied command centres. During the 100 
Days Campaign, between 8 August and 11 
November 1918, the Allies reversed this trend, 
and devastated the German Army in a 
continuous series of blows that eventually forced 
the German capitulation. The Canadians took 
part in these counter offensives by spearheading 
the British advance, and by launching no less 
than seven major offensives. 40 The leisurely pace 
at which intelligence had been collected prior to 
such battles as Vimy Ridge ended as the need 
for speed increased. Fortunately, by mid 1918 
the intelligence system was so proficient that it 
could and did collect a tremendous amount of 
information within relatively short periods of 
time. In the crossing of the Canal du Nord at the 
end of September, the pre-battle counter battery 
intelligence proved exceedingly complete and 
accurate. In its after-action report the CBO wrote 
that "In order to make certain that at least all 
known and suspected hostile batteries were 
neutralized it was found that 113 [enemy gun] 
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positions had to be covered [by counter battery 
fire)." Knowing that some of these 113 gun pits 
would be vacant on Zero Day, the Counter 
Battery Office relied on the services of the Royal 
Air Force (RAFJ squadron attached to the corps 
to inform it as to which pits were actually active 
during the assault. The RAF was equal to the 
task, and kept the batteries up to date on 
German artillery movements. This let the heavy 
batteries save ammunition, while concentrating 
on targets where active enemy batteries really 
were situated. After the battle the CBO 
concluded, rather unassumingly, that 
"Apparently the appreciation of the hostile 
artillery situation had been substantially 
correct for there were only six batteries active 
in positions which had not been included in 
the neutralization scheme" prepared before the 
battle. In effect, nearly every German gun had 
been located prior to Zero Hour and targeted 
for destruction. 41 With such a wealth of 
information success in the field came all the 
easier. 
Nevertheless, the rapidity with which 
operations were now launched, and the 
Germans' better use of camouflage, dummy 
positions and tactical defensive layouts meant 
that come Zero Day less was known with 
certainty about the German lines than was the 
case in previous years' battles. This meant that 
there might be more undiscovered obstacles 
facing assaulting troops or more undisclosed 
German batteries able to pound the infantry 
crossing no-man's-land. As a result of intensive 
training programmes undertaken in the early 
summer, though, the tactical acumen of the 
average fighting man had greatly improved since 
1916-1 7, while the firepower of his unit had 
increased dramatically. 42 Unknown obstacles, be 
they wire entanglements or German machine gun 
posts, were overcome by men confident in their 
abilities to carry on without their having to wait 
for tank and artillery support. The Battle of 
Amiens beginning on 8 August 1918, perhaps 
more than any other Great War battle, shows 
that well trained men could successfully confront 
an entrenched enemy in largely unknown ground 
and still out manoeuvre them. 
The Canadians had moved to the Amiens 
Sector in such secrecy, and in such haste, that 
most commands only had time for a cursory 
examination of the ground and their objectives 
before going over the top. In some cases the 
attacking troops, having travelled some 50 to 
60 miles to get to the area, only arrived with a 
few hours to spare. However, the decentralisation 
of tactical decision-making practised in the 
summer meant higher command could now rely 
German prisoners and wounded Canadians coming through the 
mud during the Battle of Passchendaele, November 1917. NAG PA40126 
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on the fighting prowess and tactical skill of their 
men, rather than on top-down, minute-by-
minute plans of the Vimy Ridge variety. 
Planning remained highly centralised, to be 
sure, and orders were still packed with details 
gathered by the intelligence organisation, but 
their execution was left more and more to the 
men doing the actual fighting. Reports on the 
action make this plainly clear. A 7th Battalion 
report noted that artillery preparation for 
Amiens had been excellent. "As far as this 
Battalion was concerned, isolated Machine 
Guns and Rifle fire, were all that had to be 
dealt with ... It was amply demonstrated that the 
training in open warfare undergone whilst the 
Corps was in rest was all to the good, by the 
rapidity with which they were overcome with 
very light casualties to ourselves." The 1Oth 
Battalion echoed these sentiments when it 
wrote that "the value of the recent training in 
open warfare was very apparent, especially the 
methods of overcoming machine gun 
opposition, and the tactical exercises which 
involved lengthy advances over more or less 
unknown territory, were very useful."43 The 5th 
Brigade described how on the second day of the 
battle the German machine gun nests still 
surviving: 
were dealt with entirely by manoeuvre. Small 
parties of scouts followed by Lewis Guns worked 
up ditches, sunken roads and other dead ground 
until the enemy's Machine Guns were put out of 
action or forced to retire by enfilade fire from a 
l1ank. When this had been accomplished a signal 
was given to the Infantry. who meantime had 
remained under cover, that they could advance. 
Successive positions were dealt with in this 
manner without incurring undue casualties.44 
Over in the 4th Canadian Division "The 
enemy had a very strong Machine gun Defence 
organized in the woods ... [This] opposition was 
overcome by the successful employment of the 
combined action of one Infantry Company of the 
78th Battalion, an 18 pdr. Battery, 4 or 5 Tanks 
and a 6 [inch] Trench Mortar, resulting in many 
casualties to the enemy, the capture of 20 
prisoners and 12 Machine guns."45 
Information, as well as tactical proficiency, 
was crucial to men advancing across no-man's-
land in the new combat environment. But the 
need for information placed great stress on 
available communications. Fittingly, by the 
summer of 1918, communications had greatly 
22 
improved. 46 On those occasions where previously 
undisclosed enemy artillery was pounding an 
advance, or when machine gun nests and wire 
entanglements were unyielding, the intelligence 
organisation quickly transmitted the news and 
nature of the hold-ups to those service arms that 
could best provide assistance. An assortment of 
ground observers (the artillery's Forward 
Observation Officers, scouts, and infantry 
observers), along with observers from the RAF, 
the CCSS, and the Army organised sound 
rangers, among a host of others monitoring the 
advance, relayed an unending stream of news to 
the Counter Battery Office, tank headquarters, 
and other commands capable of affecting the 
front line situation. Any hold-ups were quickly 
dealt with, and usually by the crushing blow of 
concentrated artillery fire. 
By 1918, most of the intelligence effort that 
occurred before and during battle concerned the 
needs of the artillery. Andrew McNaughton, the 
man who organised and ran the CBO until the 
last weeks of the war, recalled later that "the 
whole of our intelligence system was centred on 
those who had the means at their disposal to 
take immediate and effective action. "47 Those 
with "the means at their disposal" were the 
gunners who, for the most part, were under 
corps and divisional control. 48 Since the artillery 
could break up massing enemy troops preparing 
for counter attacks, disrupt the arrival of enemy 
reinforcements, ammunition, and food supplies, 
silence and harass enemy guns, and eliminate 
obstacles and pernicious pockets of enemy 
troops and machine gun nests, it was the arm 
that most readily influenced the course of battle, 
and was most needful of up-to-date intelligence. 
Reliable communications were obviously vital. 
but so too were the men and special teams 
gathering the information in the first place. Their 
efforts bestowed enormous freedom of action on 
corps, divisional and artillery officers who now 
had sufficient information for taking advantage 
of opportunities to inflict damage on enemy 
troops and positions, and do so while battles 
developed. The successful break-up of German 
counter attacks, for example, was a direct result 
of either careful study of pre-battle intelligence 
regarding normal German routes of approach, 
billeting areas and likely assembly areas, or of 
word reaching the gunners during an attack that 
German troops were seen massing at some 
point.49 During the fighting for Valenciennes in 
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the closing days of the war, "Great importance 
was attached to the harassing of all important 
routes of approach, sunken roads and valleys;" 
and in order "to give the infantry every possible 
assistance at what was expected to be critical 
parts of the battle, proposed assembly areas of 
the enemy were subjected to timed 
concentrations from the counter battery artillery." 
A post battle review of the artillery's part at 
Valenciennes "showed that very valuable results 
had been obtained." Thanks in part to accurate 
intelligence on such positions, "the enemy's 
supplies of ammunition and reinforcements 
[were] evidently greatly interfered with. The 
casualties to the enemy's transport were 
particularly high in the sunken roads .. .In some 
cases the road was practically blocked by the 
destroyed wagons and dead animals. "50 
The RAF played an important intelligence role 
throughout the 100 Days. Due to the speed with 
which pilots could deliver news to the gunners, 
the importance of the corps squadron as a source 
of counter battery and other intelligence 
continued to expand. Intelligence gathered by the 
RAF usually arrived at the CBO within minutes 
of its collection. This meant gunners could 
continually harass German troops and batteries. 
One Counter Battery Office memorandum 
explained: "In the moving [battle] the aeroplane 
forms the greatest source of intelligence. Its 
advantage being that reliable information 
regarding the disposition and movement of 
enemy troops and the strength and grouping of 
the Hostile Artillery can be quickly delivered to 
the General Staff."51 According to Lieutenant 
Colonel H.D.G. Crerar, who replaced 
McNaughton at the CBO during the last weeks 
of the war, the Corps Squadron was "very often 
the only reliable source of information" on the 
location of hostile batteries, and that "the 
effective neutralizing of hostile artillery fire at 
critical moments may depend almost entirely 
upon the work of the Corps Squadron."52 At 
Valenciennes "special importance" was attached 
to the Corps Squadron's role in locating hostile 
batteries on the day of battle. During that action 
the Germans employed "roving batteries" that 
moved across the front as needed. These were 
difficult to locate by ground level means, so aerial 
observers played a crucial role in finding them 
through direct observation. Aerial photography 
was useless for tracking such guns, as the 
Germans did not dig pits for them, or keep them 
long in one spot. During the battle, aerial 
observers were therefore called upon to locate 
all those guns that "had been impossible to 
locate definitely prior to zero hour on account 
of their having either remained silent or been 
deployed in new positions." A CBO after-action 
report declared that "On the whole the results 
obtained [by the Corps Squadron] were most 
gratifying ... Evidence from all sources 
substantiates the fact that [German artillery] 
shelling at zero and throughout the day was in 
no way a menace to the advance of our 
infantry ... A great deal of the [success of the] 
neutralization programme for the day must be 
attributed to the pilots and observers of No. 5 
Squadron." Indeed, so effective were the pilots 
at Valenciennes that "it was possible to follow 
the enemy's artillery manoeuvres throughout 
the day."53 
The First World War saw technological 
advances that completely altered the face of 
battle from what had been expected. Trenches, 
barbed wire, machine guns and artillery 
stopped armies in their tracks and forced men 
to dig into the earth. The resulting deadlock 
offered a unique opportunity for the 
development of a tactical intelligence 
organisation. The closeness of the opposing 
lines, and the power of the defence, demanded 
that they be constantly observed. With machine 
guns and artillery capable of killing thousands 
of men in a single day and checking attacks, 
sometimes before they even started, with 
relative ease, it was crucial that the enemy's 
position and habits be studied in order for 
thorough planning to take place. The shock of 
modern warfare, combined with unreliable 
communications and an ever-expanding 
battlefield, also meant that commanders charged 
with preparing and waging battle were bound to 
lose control of the action once it began. The 
development of the set-piece assault, however, 
helped prevent this from happening on a regular 
basis. As the name implies, set-piece attacks tried 
to account for all contingencies and eliminate all 
known obstacles in advance of the infantry going 
over the top. Such intensive pre-planing 
consumed a tremendous amount of information. 
Early in the war the Canadians were unprepared 
for the enormity of the task, and were without 
intelligence units in their front-line commands 
capable of collecting the required details. By 
1916 this had begun to change, as battalions 
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and brigades, for example, began employing 
specialised scouting units. The year 1917 saw 
further refinements and adaptations, as well 
as the perfecting of the set-piece assault. That 
year also witnessed the development of an 
intelligence organisation that could quickly 
retrieve, verify and manage the information 
pouring into the various intelligence centres. 
Fine-tuning continued into 1918, and during 
the 100 Days Campaign General Currie, the 
commander of the Canadian Corps since the 
summer of 1917, believed that the intelligence 
service possessed greater "elasticity than 
hitherto" and was "adaptable to conditions as 
they arose." With such flexibility, of course, the 
Canadians could amass an incredible amount 
of information on short notice and over great 
distances. As a result, the Canadian Corps was 
continuously supplied with vital information 
for making plans and preparing movements 
even though the tactical environment was far 
more fluid than it had been only a year earlier. 
Such versatility, in turn, helped make it 
possible for the Canadians to launch a series 
of attacks that, when combined with those 
waged by its Allies, smashed the German Army. 
Certainly, intelligence work was not the only 
contributing factor to the Corps' ability to win 
battles, but it was an indispensable ingredient. 
The Canadians may have entered the First 
World War without a well-developed or defined 
intelligence service, but by November 1918, this 
had been reversed. At the time of the Armistice, 
wrote Currie, "the Canadian Corps Intelligence 
Service," was "very complete;" its "system of 
collecting and co-ordinating 
information ... could almost be categorized as 
perfect. "54 
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